Fulfilling a Dream: Francis Harris's Civil War Story, Part 4 (The Battle of Chancellorsville)

When I left off the last installment of the story of Private Francis Harris and the Union 12th New Jersey Regiment, it was the beginning of May 1863, just over 2 years into the Civil War. The 12th had just spent a long and generally uneventful winter (other than the news of Emancipation), as part of the 130,000-strong Army of the Potomac, in Falmouth in central Virginia, across from Robert E. Lee and his famous Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (about half the size of the Union force- in Fredericksburg, halfway between the two opposed capitals of Washington and Richmond). Here I can add to the historical record, thanks to Harris's lengthy diary entries and letters, a new account of the battle to come.

The Union commander of that army since January, Gen. Joseph Hooker, had already achieved wonders. To start with, he had restored the morale, which had plummeted through the disastrous actions of his predecessor. He did so through consistently supplying “soft bread” and other food improvements, by better discipline and organization (including symbols for the biggest units, the army corps), and above all through much broader and fairer family leaves, usually for 40 days (furloughs, though our central character, Private Harris, has yet to receive one- he is sorely missing his wife Maggie and three children). Hooker’s second miracle is that, through a combination of work of the first good intelligence service of the Civil War and his own skillful planning, he had now, to everyone’s amazement, managed to deceive Gen. Lee- to the point of putting Lee’s army, the most important of all Confederate armies, in serious danger. By dividing his army and moving fast enough and secretively enough, Hooker now had about 2/3 of his army across the two river barriers (the Rappahannock and Rapidan) to confront Lee from the west, as the remaining third, under Gen. Sedgwick, was crossing the lower Rappahannock and threatening Lee, in Fredericksburg, from the east. Lee’s army was now squarely between two massive and menacing forces, both far better equipped and fed than the ragged and hungry Confederate veterans.

Col. J.H. Willett, commander of Harris & the 12th New Jersey at Chancellorsville

Harris and the 12th, a small part of Gen. Hancock’s II Corps (over 13,000), had never been in combat yet. They knew that they were, at last, about to “see the elephant” in the expression of Civil War soldiers- to be tested by actual battle. It’s likely that they were experiencing some combination of a set of predictable emotions: excitement, fear (Harris, and no doubt many others, fired off letters to loved ones, asking for their prayers), and uncertainty- the internal questioning in facing first combat (will I stay or run in the face of mortal danger? will I let my comrades and myself down?). But they had every reason for optimism at this point. They had been training for this moment since the previous August, and, while their winter cabins had been quite comfortable, their routine grind of guard duty (picketing), drills, reviews and inspections had become very boring. A few weeks earlier they had been in a review they would always remember, a grand review of over 50,000 gathered together, parading in dress uniforms past President Lincoln himself- and thus they had seen, first-hand, the might of their army. Although Lee and his legendary assistant, “Stonewall” Jackson, were feared and respected by Hooker’s men, they trusted Hooker, and all of the signs were that he had put their army in a winning position. Harris himself had made sure to become a crack shot (the only accomplishment he ever boasted of in all of his writings!). He was also powerfully sustained by the love of his family, by his own deep religious faith (he attended, or even organized, prayer meetings as often as possible), and by his faith in the Union cause (that both crushing the rebellion and freeing the slaves were God’s will).

Unfortunately, as I hinted at the end of the last post, Hooker had made mistakes, and was about to make more (a dire fact that would not be apparent to the men of the 12th until well into the upcoming Battle of Chancellorsville). His first two mistakes took place just before he moved against Lee: one, that he sent his brilliant chief of artillery, Gen. Henry Hunt, off to a desk job. Instead of having this essential military arm under central control (as the enemy did), each unit had a small number of cannons assigned to it. Union firepower, normally far greater, was thus much less organized and effective. Two- Hooker had sent almost all his cavalry off on a long expedition to destroy Lee’s supply railroads and threaten Richmond. Cavalry in this war was crucial, both for screening and protecting slow-moving infantry and for providing information about the enemy’s whereabouts and strength. This meant that Hooker, once across the rivers and close to Lee, simply didn’t know where Lee’s units were.

First (encounter) phase of the Battle of Chancellorsville. Map drawn by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, found on Wikipedia. Red= Confederate, blue= Union. 12th in Couch's.

As a result, Lee’s response to the threat I’ve explained caught Hooker off guard. Instead of staying in his fortified positions (where he would have been trapped), or retreating toward Richmond (where the two Union forces could catch him on the move), Lee improvised. He divided his smaller army, leaving about 10,000 on the fortified ridge above Fredericksburg, while he led the bulk of his men rapidly west to confront Hooker. In turn Hooker was shocked when his advance forces, moving along parallel dirt roads toward Lee, met, on the afternoon of May 1, a large and aggressive force of Confederates, far sooner than expected.

That surprise led to Hooker’s next mistake. His men were fired up, and Hooker’s commanders knew that they had a much stronger force. His whole army was primed to keep on advancing. So everyone was astonished, and his commanders were angry, when, in early afternoon, Hooker abruptly ordered his advance units (including a confused 12th New Jersey!) to pull back and form a defensive ring around the area of Chancellorsville (not even a real village- just a plantation house and outbuildings in a large clearing). This retreat was, in turn, a double mistake. First, because of geography. Chancellorsville was in the midst of an area of thick woods and brush known as “the Wilderness”. Being in that kind of landscape, unlike being out in the open flat farmland that lay just where his army had been going, had two big negative consequences: the enemy could not be easily seen, and artillery, so important for the Union army, could not be effectively used (in most cases the gunners couldn’t see their targets!). The other mistake was that Hooker was giving Lee the initiative (as it turned out, for all the rest of the battle).

Hooker’s halt on the 1st gave Lee the chance to come up with an even more daring plan for the next day. He and Jackson, that evening, decided that Jackson, at his best when attacking, would, with most of Lee’s men (almost 30,000), spend most of May 2 circling Hooker’s army by a route far to the west. Lee had discovered that the smallest of the Union corps, Howard’s XI, was positioned with one end “in the air”, that is not fortified or connected to other Union units. Jackson’s men could thus “roll up” the enemy, catching them by surprise, and sending panicked men hurtling into each of the successive neighbor units. By doing so, ideally Lee’s 45,000 could shatter Hooker’s 90,000, doing serious harm to the Union cause.

Map of Jackson's Flank Attack, drawn by Hal Jespersen, cwmaps.com, found on Wikipedia.

And it nearly worked. Hooker got reports all day of a large force of the enemy moving somewhere in the distance, and he did warn Howard to prepare for some sort of attack. But, as the hours went by and nothing was heard from that large force, Hooker made a fateful assumption. He interpreted the reports as indicating that Lee was withdrawing most of his army! He did order one testing of the force that remained in front of him (which was now a small fraction of his own!), but didn’t get an accurate view of how weak Lee actually was. And so, at about 5:30 in the evening, Howard’s men suddenly had deer and other animals come racing out of the brush and on through their camp. Behind came 30,000 yelling Confederates. Some in the XI Corps did try to stand and fight, but the majority did flee, right toward Hooker’s headquarters in the Chancellorsville clearing. French’s division, to which the 12th belonged, was ordered to move to act as a reserve- behind the division, Berry’s, that actually stopped the enemy attack by nightfall. Harris wrote in his diary for May 2, 1863:

“Our advance checked their infantry, and we were ordered to fall down in the woods at the side of the road while the batteries played from both sides. To see the shell from both sides was awful yet splendid. Two in Co. N.[H] was wounded. When the firing ceased we formed a line of battle in the woods on the right of the plank road, to remain for the night. Our lines in front kept advancing until we gained the next elevation of ground and posted a battery. To do this our forces were engaged twice through the night with shot and shell.”

This day, therefore, marked the first time in its history that the 12th New Jersey was under enemy fire. But May 3 would mean far more than just being close to the spectacle of shellfire.

Overall map of battle on morning that 12th NJ was attacked by Heth's division. Drawn by Hal Jespersen, cwmaps.com, found on Wikipedia. 12th now separate from Couch, backing Sickles.

I have reconstructed the events of the next day as best I can. The overall battle situation is quite clear: Hooker, after Jackson had smashed Howard’s XI Corps the evening before, had withdrawn into a defensive position resembling a “figure 8” (see above), with the broader part at the top (next to the crucial river fords leading back to Union territory). As for the 12th, it had spent an uncomfortable night (having lost all its knapsacks, which they had been ordered to drop, and which someone stole after the men were last moved!). It was in the same position where it had been the day before: in the center of its brigade (William Hays’s), out in brush north of a road, behind Berry’s veteran division, facing west- in the middle of the bottom part of the “8”. Berry’s men were behind low log protection that they had thrown up to stop Jackson’s attack the night before. The 12th, by far the largest unit in its brigade (over 700), had the worn-down veteran 14th Connecticut on its right, and the similarly depleted 130th Pennsylvania on its left (a 9-month unit that was only days away from being sent home!). The other unit of the brigade, the 108th New York, also very depleted, was also positioned to the left. This brigade was separated from most of its comrades in the II Corps, who were facing east, toward the part of the Confederates personally commanded by Lee.

Screenshot from video, "Bloody Sunday- The Fight for Fairview at Chancellorsville: Chancellorsville 160" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5_xTfrW4GQ). The arrow represents the Confederate attack. This is the only map I have found which shows the 12th New Jersey, upper right, in its reserve line behind Berry's division (fortifications marked).

To the west, the flamboyant young commander of Lee’s cavalry, Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, had taken command overnight when Jackson was seriously wounded by friendly fire in the darkness (he would die, much lamented across the South, on May 10). Stuart was under instructions to attack at dawn, driving east to break the Union defenses and link up with Lee’s wing, whose men were attacking from the opposite direction. Stuart’s job was made far easier when, just as he was about to attack, Hooker made yet another important mistake. He contracted the “8” even further, giving up priceless cleared high ground known as Hazel Grove. Immediately the Confederate artillery commander, Alexander, rushed in his 40 cannons, which would provide essential support for Stuart’s attack.

The 12th likely knew very little of the big picture I’ve just explained. What would happen next, in its first battle, would be greatly affected by an unfolding leadership crisis- just at the moment that these men from New Jersey most needed leadership. I’ve already mentioned a series of mistakes by Hooker, the overall commander. Next in line was the II Corps commander, Darius Couch. He was a fine general- but he was not nearby, and, in the middle of the attack, had to take over the overall command from Hooker for a time (see below). The next leader down, division commander Gen. French, was also not nearby- he was well to the east, preoccupied with Lee’s attack. All of this meant that the immediate battle decisions that affected the 12th fell to two men: the brigade commander, Gen. William Hays, and the 12th’s own leader, Col. J. H. Willett. Within the 12th, two other important leaders were also missing at the time of battle: its second in command, Lt. Col. Davis, who had had to leave the army just two days before for hospitalization, and Harris’s own Company A commander, Capt. Chase. He was very popular with his men, having trained them well since they enlisted, but his whereabouts are a mystery. Harris mentions in a letter on Apr. 30 that Chase was not with the 12th: “Our Captain is not with us yet, and guess he will not get with us in the approaching battle. He has to follow the Reg’t. in the rear.” He never explains further, and no other source refers to Chase during the whole battle!

Stuart’s attack exploded right at dawn that Sunday, on a clear, warm spring morning, with Alexander’s guns opening up a hail of shells, as waves of infantry surged through the woods. One should envision the resulting battle, one part of the second bloodiest day in the entire war, as taking place in the dimness of first light in a dense forest, with deafening explosions and thousands of soldiers shrieking from adrenalin or pain. Question: how much clarity about the battle details can one expect in this situation? Answer: not much!

Our sources are the following: battle reports, most brief, by most of the commanders on both sides (including for each of the Union regimental leaders); Harris’s diary and letters (as usual, quite observant and detailed); and a short diary entry by Capt. Richard Thompson, commanding Co. K of the 12th. There’s also a detailed postwar account for the 108th New York. Charles Gamble, the only other private to leave a record, put down only about a paragraph, while Capt. Stratton, leader of Co. F, only noted that he lost a leg!

The unit that actually attacked the 12th and its neighbors was the 13th North Carolina, a veteran unit in the brigade led by William Dorsey Pender, also from North Carolina and one of the best commanders in Lee’s army (due to be promoted after Chancellorsville). Pender’s men hit Berry’s line with great force and broke through, though at high cost. That success also happened because Berry was killed, and because one of his subordinates, Col. Revere (grandson of the famous “The British are Coming” Paul Revere!) inexplicably took most of Berry’s division out of the battle (3 miles out!- Revere would be courtmartialed). The North Carolinians kept right on to hit Hays’s brigade and the green 12th New Jersey; the Confederates broke that line too.

That’s when the Union accounts get fuzzy; nobody wanted to admit that they, personally or their unit as a whole, ran away, and, human nature being what it is, the reports by each regimental commander put blame for the collapse on one or more neighboring units! Here’s what most likely happened: the 13th North Carolina wrapped around the men of the right-hand 14th Connecticut, taking it under fire from the front and side. That unit fled, which next put Co. F of the 12th in the danger zone. Its men ran too, and so the rout spread across the whole Union brigade (one lieutenant in the 12th was seen "running like a fox," outpacing his whole Co. I!). Two events aided in the rout: Gen. Hays, the brigade commander, and most of his staff were captured, and the 12th’s highly regarded leader, Col. Willett, went down at the start with a serious wound. As Private Gamble put it: “At last they came and we commenced firing on them. Our colonel was wounded the first round and then we had no commander and the regiment wandered everywhere; at last our lieutenant took command we commenced firing.” Maj. John Hill, who had only just joined the 12th from another unit to replace Maj. Davis, took command of the 12th and succeeded in rallying part, while Capt. Thompson rallied another portion. Eventually the parts did reunite (those who fled and those who stood fast), but that took place well in the rear, behind another Union brigade (Carroll’s). Just to add to the crisis- Gen. Hooker, in the midst of this fighting (which went on for more than 4 hours), was leaning on a column of his Chancellor House headquarters about 9am when a shell hit the post and he was badly concussed (yet he initially refused to give up command- he eventually yielded to the II Corps commander, Darius Couch, for a time).

You might be wondering now- what happened to Harris?? As he told his wife in a post-battle letter, he managed to get off two rounds from his obsolete musket. As he was about to fire a third time:

“I received my wound. I merely felt it. Samuel Mills at my right [k.] says “Frank you are wounded, ha’nt you” I looked and said no only tore my coat. Then shot and loaded again as soon as I could. Sergeant J[oseph]. Burroughs in my rear sayed “Why you are wounded for the blood is running.” I looked and behold my side was all bloody, the sight of which made me feel weak. I shot and tried to load again but my arm became weak and the barrel being warm and the ‘bucks & ball’ rammed hard so Sergeant told me to go to the rear, which I did. Finished loading while going. Afterwards I thought it would never do to go out with a loaded gun. So I turned thinking of going back, but our boys were retreating, so I halted until they were up with me, then fired the fifth time at the enemy, though this time I did not see them… I came to the house on the planes [the Chancellor House?] and feeling faint I sat down behind the house so if any shells should come over I might be safe. Here I wash my wound the best I could from my canteen, and tied tight a strip of rag, that I had previously prepared and in my pocket, above and below the wound.”

Harris was very lucky! The lead bullet passed through the muscle of his right arm, missing the bone (which it would have shattered, requiring amputation!).

He had stopped the bleeding, but he was now separated from most of his comrades. He did make it to the unit hospital, where the regimental surgeon dressed his wound more properly, and where Francis was relieved to find that his brother Robert had survived unwounded. But the hospital itself came under shellfire during the night, and Harris, with a good friend (Corp. John Edwards) decided to move on for safety, first thing on the morning of the 4th. Edwards had been wounded in the hip, and, in Harris’s words, “hobbled” the whole way- across the Rappahannock. Apparently they separated, because in another passage Harris only refers to himself; he walked all the way back to the winter camp at Falmouth: “made my way on foot for Falmouth Station. Reached near there a little after dark, but the stream was so high (of the shower of rain nearly all of the after noon) I could not cross, so I went to the Lacy house got my wound dressed and said [stayed] all night. The good woman of the house lent me a blanket to keep warm.” The Lacy house was at the center of the camp; he went there because it had been used by Union nurses as a treatment center.

He was looking in particular for a “Mrs. Harris” (no relation). This was Mrs. John Harris, wife of a Philadelphia doctor and secretary of the Ladies’ Aid Society (one of a veritable army of invaluable volunteer nurses, the most famous being Clara Barton, future founder of the American Red Cross). Since near the start of the war, she had visited dozens of hospitals, comforting the dying and providing “rest, cheerful words, and palatable food” (and clothing- thanks to boxes from her hometown) to the wounded (I haven't been able to find a picture). In Francis Harris’s case, she provided such treats as “Corn starch pudding, essenced with lemon and sweetened with cream and sugar. Ah! It was the best thing I have tasted for many a long day.” (Letter 4/14/63) Alas, she wasn’t there when he came in with his wound, but he was able to shelter there on the night of the 4th. To conclude his story of the battle’s aftermath:

“The next morning (Wednesday 5th) I returned the quilt; thanked her; had my wound dressed and set out for the [railroad] cars. The stream had so settled that I got over without any difficultly. Got into the cars reached Aquia creek station, examined and admitted on the “Mary Washington” for Washington.” (Diary 5/14/63)

Notice that once again, wounded, he made it from the Lacy house to the train on his own two feet, and then onto a train and a hospital ship! I will leave his story here for the time being; he is going to the Lincoln Hospital, on Capitol Hill, one of a host of hospitals scattered around Washington.

Back to his comrades in the 12th New Jersey. They had reunited, no doubt with much shock and shame, in the rear of their army by late on the 3rd. As for the Confederate breakthrough, once Hooker saw that threat (actually bearing down on his headquarters!), he ordered in the remaining brigades of French’s division, led by the “tough” Granite Brigade under Gen. Samuel Carroll. Pender’s men had about exhausted their ammunition, and were forced into retreat, back to about where they had started in the morning. According to a lieutenant in the 13th North Carolina, who wrote the one detailed account I’ve found for the Confederate side, the mood of his unit was exultant that night (especially about the capture of an enemy general!). But the cost, to these farm boys from western North Carolina, had been fearful. Lt. Nathaniel Smith recorded: “As before stated, the 13th NC Regiment went in at 5 o'clock with three hundred and forty-two good men. When we fell back to the enemy's works, filled up cartridge-boxes, and at one o'clock each company called the roll, one hundred and thirty-nine (139) men answered to their names…”

About 10:30 on the morning of the 3rd, Stuart’s men did successfully penetrate the Union defenses, and reunited with Lee’s other wing in the Fairview clearing. Hooker, still woozy from his concussion, ordered the abandonment of the bottom of the “figure 8,” compressing his army, still much larger than Lee’s, around his headquarters and closer to the Rappahannock. He sent an urgent message to Gen. Sedgwick, with the remaining third of his army in Fredericksburg, ordering him to break through the greatly outnumbered Confederates there- to come to Hooker’s rescue (quite an odd situation- the general with the larger force calling for rescue by his smaller one!). Sedgwick did make progress, but only part of the way; Lee again sent away a large part of his force, and the reinforced Confederates were able to stop Sedgwick at Salem Church.

Very little happened to both armies over the next two days (4th and 5th); they mainly did the gruesome work of collecting and burying the dead and doing what they could for the wounded. On the night of the 4th, Hooker called a midnight council of his corps commanders. The five who were able to come voted 3-2 for the army to stay. Hooker nevertheless overruled them and ordered both segments of his army to retreat, back to their starting points, thus ending the Chancellorsville Campaign, which had started off with such promise. Thus the 12th New Jersey, minus Harris (and many others), found themselves back in their winter cabins, considerably discouraged, by May 6, 1863. Lincoln would soon replace Hooker, his sixth choice as Eastern commander!

Overall, the Union Army of the Potomac had lost about 14,000 of its original 130,000, or about 13%: 1,575 killed, 9,594 wounded, and the rest missing or captured. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, having won what is generally called its “greatest victory,” had lost 12,764 (1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded, 2,018 captured/missing) of its original 60,000 (22%!). Its loss of officers was particularly great (including the irreplaceable “Stonewall” Jackson). As for the 12th, its official losses (according to its new commander) were 179: 1 officer & 23 enlisted killed, 6 officers (including its colonel) & 126 enlisted wounded, and 22 missing (over 20% in a single day- the sixth-highest of the whole Union army!). Harris noted that his own Co. A, less than 100 beforehand, had two killed (including a former tent-mate with Harris), 14 wounded (including amputations that ended their military service), and 3 missing. Chancellorsville was certainly a very harsh introduction to the reality of Civil War combat. Harris would not see his unit again for almost 5 months!

That’s all for this installment, gentle readers! Before I continue Harris’s story, about his hospitalization and beyond, I am returning to my environmental focus next time. Stay tuned for my summary of an interesting assortment of endangered Chinese animals!

Resources: As stated at the start of this series, Edward Longacre's modern history of the 12th, "To Gettysburg and Beyond," is an invaluable companion to Harris's writings. I used two other published sources, William Haines' "History of Co. F" (available online) and "While My Country is in Danger" (the story of Richard Thompson, officer of the 12th, edited by Gerry and Ralph Poriss). The Confederate account can be found at (https://www.carolana.com/NC/Civil_War/13th_nc_regiment.html). The classic book on the battle is Stephen Sears, "Chancellorsville." For those with a serious interest, I highly recommend the maps and videos produced by the American Battlefield Trust on YouTube (an organization which has preserved much of this battlefield and many others).